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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
JAMES CUMMINGS, 
Def enda1nt-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12487 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of and con-
viction of robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Tlw appellant was charged by information with 
the crime of robbery, tried by a jury and found guilty. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A ppe1lant seeks reversal of the judgment of con-
viction, or in the alternative to have the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
2 
STATEME:NT OF FAC'TS 
The State's chief witness, BrycP Nelson, testified 
that on August 2, 1970 at approximately 3 :30 a.m. he was 
working at the Bonus Station at Ninth South and ·west 
Temple, (R. ::3, 4) and tlrnt an individual came in, showed 
a gun, and robbed him. (R. 4, 5) The witm•ss tPstified 
that the robber had a tnn shirt and dark pants. (R. 4) 
:Mr. Nelson testified further that after he was rohlK•d, 
the robber took him around to a restroom at the hack 
of the station and tied him up '"ith his own lwlt. (R. 6) 
Mr. Nelson testified that the rob her then k•ft and that 
he freed himself (R G) and called the police. (R. G) The 
witness made an in court identification of the defendant 
as the roLber (R. 4) frcm his ge1wrnl nppearnnee, (H. 7) 
but stated that he eould not idmtify his voice•. (R. 7) 
The witness said that alt1iongh lie co1llct not 
now n•memher the d<:>frndant's voice•, it seemed like hP 
n•cogniz<:>d the voice in the lini'-llfl. (R. 8) ·when being 
questioned in regard to the liiw-np, tlw witn<•ss was 
ask<>d, "He just walked in and yon recognized him." 
The witness answPred: "l ('an't nu11·1nlwr." (TI. 10) Tl[(~ 
witness thonglit tlw dc->fendant wac; :-:tnnding on nmulwr 
three. (R. 10) HP eoul<l not n~111e111lwr wl1at the man 
standing on number onP Juul look<>Cl lih. ( H. 10) Th(' 
witnrss rPsponded to tlt(' qnestion ''Can yon n·rn<-•111bn 
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any of the other people?" with the answer "faintly." 
The ·witness testified that he was at the line-up ten or 
fifteen minutes (R. 11) whereas he had stated that the 
robbery had taken only three of four minutes. (R. 7) 
The defendant's wife testified that on the night 
of the robbery her husband was home in bed with her 
(R. 30) as he was on every night after their marriage on 
the tenth of July. (R. 34) The defendant testified that 
he did not rob Bryce Nelson (R. 37) and that he did not 
know the location of the place where robbery occurred. 
(R 40) 
Mr. Jay D. Edmonds, who attended the line-up in 
his capacity as a public defender, testified from his notes 
taken at the line-up to the following: 
1. The defendant was ten pounds heavier than the 
next heaviest man in the line-up. (R. 43) 
2. The defendant was one inch shorter than the next 
shortest man in the line-up (R. 43) 
3. The man on the defendant's right had bright red 
hair and frpckles. (R. 43) 
-!. 'l\rn of the nwn had blond hair. (R. 43) 
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6. The other individuals joked and laughed and one 
said his lines backwards. (R. 44) 
6. Mr. Cummings appeared very frightened. (R. 44) 
7. Mr. Cummings was the only one that was muscu-
lar. (R. 44, 49) 
8. Mr. Cummings was obvious to him. (R. 45) 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THE LINE-UP IDENTIFICATION 
MADE IT SO UNNECESSARILY SUGGESTIVE 
AND CONDUCIVE TO IRREPARABLE MIST AKEN 
IDENTIFICATION AS TO DENY DEFENDANT 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The defendant ·was the only one in the line-up who 
physically resembled the deRcription of the robber which 
the police had been giv<-'n by the ·wi tnPss. This couple(l 
with the other circumstances surrounding the identifica-
tion made the rn·ocednn' in its totality so umwcrssarily 
suggestive and conducive to irrrparnble mistaken iuen ti-
fication as to dPny due process. 
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ln Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. :293, 87 S. Ct. 19G7 
(19G7) the Supreme Court recognized that where the 
li11e-up ·was unnecessarily suggestive, it was subject to 
attack upon the grounds that it denied due process. In 
Palnier v. Peyton, 359 F. 2d lm> (1966) an earlier case, 
the 1'1 ourth Circuit reversed finding that the identifica-
tion evidPnce ·was tak<'n in a ''highly suggestive atmos-
phere." In Long v. United States, 424 F. 2d 799 (19G9), 
the Court noted "the sources of suggestiveness in an 
e~ve-·witness i den tifica ti on are su htle.'' 
Jn Eye-Wit11ess Identification in Criminal Cases, 
l'atrick ::'IL ·wan, 19<J;), thu author stat(•s at page 47: 
"Th<~re is a certain amount of suggestion inherent 
in every line-up procNlure. \Vhen an eye-witnPss 
to a C'rime is asked by the 11olice to come to the 
station l10nsP and view a line-up, he usm;ally 
lwlieves tlia t a good suspect has been picked up 
and will hP onl~ of the memlwn; of the line-up. 
'Thns, thPre is a trnoenc:r on his part to identify 
t11P rwrson who lllO~~t nParly l'PS('lllhles his recol-
k,rtion of tlH' rwrpetrator of the crime, a tendency 
w11ieh i~' qnit<• difficult to corn hat." 
Ur. ?\ e>lson was told to come to the line-up by the 
polic·1· lwnrnsP ''tlH':· had a sm;pect. (R. 9) In State v. 
Fn;in, :22 Ftah 2d 21G, -1-15 P. 2d 372 (1969) the Utah 
('onrt ::-:aid ''\V(' an~ in f!rrord with the idt>a that a line-up 
:-;lionU lH' rn'itlH'l' so d1•\'isNl nor manipulated as to impel 
or to he unduly suggestive as to identification." In 
Unded States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 192G 
( 1967) revPrsed for lack of counsel at line-up, the court 
talks of "suggestive procedures" including where "other 
participants in a lirn~-np 'IYPl'<> grossly dissimilar in 
appearance to the suspect." 
The defendant was the only person physically fitting 
the description of the rohber. All the other individuals 
in the line-up were taller and much thinner than the 
defendant; (R. 43) two of the others had blond hair; 
(R. 44) the one next to thP defendant on his right had 
"bright red hair and freckles; (R. 43) and nonP of the 
other subjects were muscular. (R. 44) The defendant's 
attorney at the line-up felt that in terms of physical 
description the defendant stood out "because he is very, 
very muscular and no one else in the line-up was 
muscular." (R. 49) 
Over six weeks lapsed between the time of the 
robbery on August 2 (R. 3) and the lin0-up September 
16. Obviously memory lapses with time, a fact recog-
nized by the Oregon Supreme Conrt in stating ''The 
witnesses are more likely to he ablP to make a reliable 
identification shortly after the crime than later." State 
v. J}fadden, 1 Or. A. 242, 461 P. 2d 834 (19G9), Perry v. 
United States, ................ F. 2d _______________ D.C. Cir. (1971) 
likewise. 
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When questioned a8 to his identification of the 
defendant as the robber, Mr. N elson'8 answers were 
tenuous at the very least. In court the witness could not 
identify the defendant's voice, (R. 7) yet, he said it 
seerned like he recognized it in the line-up. (R. 8) \Vhen 
a8ked the question, "He just walkPd in and you 
recognized him?" the identifying witnes, Mr. Nelson, 
answered "I can't remember." (R. 10) Mr. Nelson said 
he could not remember what any of the other members 
of the line-up looked like and explained saying "I just 
didn't look at them that much. I recognized the def end-
ant when he walked in." (R. 11) 
rrhis is a direct contradiction b~r the witness of his 
testimony thirty seconds prior. It further indicates that 
(~ither he did not look at the other individuals in the 
line-up or that these other individuals did not sufficient-
ly match the description of the robber to merit a second 
glanc0. 
In TVndr, the Conrt found that the purpose of 
counsel's prPsPrn•e a line-up is to protect the defendant's 
right to a fair lin0-up by allowing his attorney the oppor-
tunity to later scrutinize the identification procednr0 
nsecl. Aside from tlw physical ohiviousness of defendant, 
the attorne~r pr<'S<'nt at th0 line-up testified that Mr. 
Cmnmings appPared very frightrned, (R. 44) and that 
t11t> otlwr individuals job'd and laughed and that onP 
said his lin<'s hackwards. (R. 44) Tn summing np the 
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line-up, the def Pndant 's attorney found that l\I r. Cum-
mings was obvious to him. ( R. .J.f"i) 
In Convicting the I nnoceid, Ed\\·in :.\f. Borchard, 
GardPn City Publishing Co., 19:12, the author stated "tlw 
major source of tlwse tragic errors is an identifica tiun 
of the accused hy the victim of a crime of violence." 
Borchard furth(~J' found a reason for this O<'currancP. 
''Juries sC'em disposed more readily to <'redit the VC'racity 
and reliability of the victims of an outrage than any 
amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of the 
accused, \Yhether by way of alibi, character witness, or 
other testimony." 
CONCLUSION 
The only evidence 1n·c>sc•ntc>d against l\fr. Cummings 
was that of a very tmuous id<>ntification from a line-up 
in which he was the onl:v part~· physically eligible fur 
selection. In so far as 1\1 r. Cummings categorically 
denies committing the crime and is supported by alibi, 
his conviction rests on too nebulous a ground to allow 
it to stand. The defrndant ask:;; for a l'PV<>rsal. 
DA YID P. RHODE 
Attorney for Appellant 
